Google is one of the largest companies in the world, but that simple statement understates its power and reach. Through its flagship search engine, Google exercises extraordinary control over the flow of information across the internet and society. Over more than two decades, it expanded its business offerings, achieving dominance in not just search but also online ads and the distribution of smartphone apps. Almost all of us interact with Google every day, whether we realize it or not.

But Google did not achieve market dominance solely on its merits or through fair competition. Instead, the company engaged in various anti-competitive and exclusionary conduct, resulting in illegal monopolies in the markets for Android app distribution and in-app payments,[1] general internet search, and search text advertising.[2] In addition, multiple pending federal and state lawsuits allege that Google has illegally maintained a trifecta of monopolies in open web digital advertising.[3] The effect of Google’s various illegal monopolies has been to diminish competition, restrict new market entry, and, ultimately, undermine innovation.

The landmark case against Google Search was initiated under the Trump administration in October 2020, joined by a bipartisan group of 38 state attorneys general, and diligently pursued under the Biden administration. Following a 10-week trial, the D.C. District Court ruled in favor of the United States on August 5, 2024, marking the first major win in a Section 2 illegal monopolization case in a quarter-century.

The Court now turns to the equally, if not more, significant question of how to remedy Google’s illegal monopoly. An ineffective remedy would render the hard-fought liability finding toothless. Crafting an effective remedy is a creative policymaking endeavor as much as it is an exercise in applying legal precedent. The Court has broad discretion to pry open competition in relevant markets and prevent the reemergence of monopoly as the experience of internet search evolves. To that end, the Justice Department has provided a preliminary remedies framework that suggests a comprehensive approach to relieving the affected markets from Google’s monopoly grip.[4]

Even the most principled remedy is no remedy at all if implementation is kept in limbo for years while the monopolist consolidates its power. Would-be rivals like Neeva and Branch have shut down or withered on the vine in the face of Google’s monopoly grip. Several other potential rivals have created innovative alternatives to Google but have failed to achieve more than a nominal share of the market. Meanwhile, Google has indicated its intent to appeal the Court’s ruling, which could result in a multi-year delay in the implementation of a final remedies order.[5] The Court can anticipate this multi-year delay by adopting interim relief, including by preventing Google from entering further exclusionary contracts, which were at the core of Google’s liability. The Court may also order a moratorium on further acquisitions in the affected and related markets.

This brief explores many of the remedies available to the Court in the Google Search antitrust litigation. In doing so, this brief seeks to elevate the below principles:

• Remedies must be structural to eliminate incentives to engage in anti-competitive conduct. The most effective means of eliminating anti-competitive behavior is to remove incentives for that behavior to occur in the first place. For this reason, the Court should favor a structural breakup of Google, including both Android and Chrome, into separate business entities. Profit-maximizing corporations are likely to interpret behavioral orders strictly and narrowly, and courts should resist the imposition of remedies that are easily circumvented.
• Remedies must include both structural and behavioral relief. There is no silver bullet to address Google’s anti-competitive conduct. An effective remedy will need to comprehensively address structural barriers to market entry as well as anti-competitive conduct that would risk the reemergence of monopoly in the affected and adjacent markets.
• Remedies must jump-start competition and anticipate the future of search. Existing and nascent rivals must be able to meaningfully differentiate and monetize their products while availing themselves of opportunities to distribute them. As the market for internet search evolves, including with the advent of artificial intelligence (AI), durable competition can be achieved by allowing rivals fair and reasonable access to search infrastructure, including Google’s web index and AI language model.
• Remedies must be easily administered and enforceable. The Court can facilitate an administrable remedy, while minimizing costly, ongoing oversight, through the appointment of independent monitors with requisite experience in technology, structural separation, and workplace protocols. This brief provides an expansive view of compliance and enforcement remedies, including whistleblower anti-retaliation protections and a prohibition against Google’s systematic destruction of records.

In Section II of this report, we outline relevant legal authority supporting a broad and flexible approach to thinking about remedies. In Section III, we provide a technological digest of Google Search and other relevant markets, to ground a remedies discussion in an understanding of how a general search engine works. In Section IV, we provide a cursory overview of the use of structural and behavioral remedies historically, and make an argument for a combination of both structural and behavioral remedies in the instant case. In Section V, we propose numerous structural and behavioral remedies aimed at prying open competition in existing and future related markets. Here, we also propose remedies that would end Google’s systematic destruction of records, prevent retaliation and surveillance in the workplace, and minimize ongoing court supervision.

While the recommendations in this brief are specific to the Google Search case, this remedies framework nevertheless provides a methodology that is adaptable to the consideration of remedies in other antitrust litigation, for technology markets and beyond.

[1] Epic v. Google, N.D. Cal., Case No. 3:20-cv-05671 (jury verdict rendered on December 11, 2023).

[2] United States et al. v. Google (“Google Search”), D.D.C., Case No. 1:20-cv-03010 (opinion rendered on August 5, 2024).

[3] United States et al. v. Google (“Google Ad Tech”), E.D. Va., Case No. 1:23-cv-00108 (pending); Texas et al. v. Google, E.D. Tex., Case No. 4:20-cv-00957 (pending).

[4] Supra, note 2, Dkt. No. 1052 (“Notice of Plaintiffs’ Proposed Remedy Framework”).

[5] Anticipating the length of delay requires a great degree of speculation. Judge Mehta of the D.C. District Court anticipates arriving at a final remedies order in August 2025, at which point Google may file a Notice of Appeal to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. The median time from Notice of Appeal to disposition in the D.C. Circuit is 12 months, or until Fall 2026. Either party may then file a Petition for Cert to the Supreme Court, which could delay implementation of a remedy until 2028.